Rule Utilitarianism, Relevance of Intention, and Moral Permissibility of Terrorism

摘要

Rule utilitarianism, relevance of intention and moral permissibility of terrorismIn this paper I consider the puzzling question of moral responsibility of some quite specific terrorist acts. One distinguishable, but highly controversial, example of such a case may be the allied terror-bombing of German cities by English and American forces during the end of World War II, with so many civilian victims. I propose strict definition of terrorism, and after that, go on with the question: Is it really so obvious and certain that all acts of terrorism are impermissible on moral grounds? Then I investigate the relevance of intention for moral evaluation of any case of terrorism. In these matters I get involved in dispute with Jeff McMahan’s thesis that all acts of terrorism are inherently morally wrong and impermissible, and criticize his employment of the Principle of Double Effect.