In this Paper, we investigate the security of Zhang, Li and Guo quantum key distribution via quantum encryption protocol [$ext{Phys. Rev. A} extbf{64}, 24302 (2001)$] and show that it is not secure against some of Eve's attacks and with the probability one half she gets all of keys without being detected by the two parties. The main defect in this protocol is that there is an attack strategy by which Eve can change the previously shared Bell state between Alice and Bob to two Bell states among herself and Alice and Bob. Hence, we show that with probability $1/d$ its generalization to $d$-dimension systems is not secure and show that its extension to the case of more partners based on the reusable GHZ states is not secure and with probability one half Eve gets all of keys without being detected by the two parties. In what follows, we show how in going to higher dimensions those protocols can be repaired.
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机译：在本文中，我们通过量子加密协议调查了张，李和郭量子密钥分布的安全[$ 文本{phys。 Rev. a} textbf {64}，24302（2001）$]并表明它不对夏娃的某些攻击和概率一半的概率不安全，而且两方没有检测到所有钥匙。本协议中的主要缺陷是存在攻击策略，通过该攻击策略可以将先前共享的Alice和Bob之间的先前共享的钟声改变为两个贝尔和鲍勃。因此，我们展示了概率1 / D $的概率到$ d $ -dimension系统并不安全，并表明它对基于可重用GHz状态的更多合作伙伴的案例的扩展并不安全，并且概率下半夜概率下降所有钥匙都没有被双方检测到。在下文中，我们展示了如何进行更高的维度，这些协议可以修复。
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