首页> 外文OA文献 >PRICE COMPETITION UNDER COST UNCERTAINTY: A LABORATORY ANALYSIS
【2h】

PRICE COMPETITION UNDER COST UNCERTAINTY: A LABORATORY ANALYSIS

机译:价格竞争降价不确定性:实验室分析

代理获取
本网站仅为用户提供外文OA文献查询和代理获取服务,本网站没有原文。下单后我们将采用程序或人工为您竭诚获取高质量的原文,但由于OA文献来源多样且变更频繁,仍可能出现获取不到、文献不完整或与标题不符等情况,如果获取不到我们将提供退款服务。请知悉。
获取外文期刊封面目录资料

摘要

We study the relation between the number of firms and price-cost margins under price competition with uncertainty about competitors' costs. We present results of an experiment in which two, three and four identical firms repeatedly interact in this environment. In line with the theoretical prediction, market prices decrease with the number of firms, but on average stay above marginal costs. Pricing is less aggressive in duopolies than in triopolies and tetrapolies. However, independently from the number of firms, pricing is more aggressive than in the theoretical equilibrium. Both the absolute and the relative surpluses increase with the number of firms. Total surplus is close to the equilibrium level, since enhanced consumer surplus through lower prices is counteracted by occasional displacements of the most efficient firm in production.
机译:我们研究了价格竞争下的公司数量和价格成本利润率之间的关系,不确定竞争对手的成本。我们呈现了一个实验的结果,其中两个,三个和四家相同的公司在这种环境中反复互动。符合理论预测,市场价格随着企业人数而减少,但平均保持超越边际成本。定价在二息和四级胶水中的侵略性较少。但是,独立于公司的数量,定价比理论均衡更具侵略性。绝对和相对盈余都随着公司的数量而增加。总盈余接近均衡水平,由于通过较低价格的增强的消费者盈余因偶尔生产的生产中最有效的公司而抵消。

著录项

  • 作者

    KLAUS ABBINK; JORDI BRANDTS;

  • 作者单位
  • 年度 2005
  • 总页数
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 {"code":"en","name":"english","id":9}
  • 中图分类

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
代理获取

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号