The MARKET GARDEN Campaign: Allied operational command in Northwest Europe, 1944

摘要

This dissertation examines in detail, the planning, conduct, and context ofAllied Operational Command during the period from the Normandy Invasion to theend of Operation MARKET GARDEN, the airborne invasion of Holland. Thesecampaigns were influenced by several factors: the nature of the Allied Coalition, thediffering views and approach to battle of the separate services and the differentnationalities within the coalition, and the actual conduct of battle within the context ofa larger effort, the military campaign.The 1944c ampaignw as uniquei n that it representedth e two year evolution ofa political-military coalition, whose campaign conduct in the field was overseen by afully integratedh eadquartersa nd whose staff was composedo f memberso f both theindividual services and separaten ationalities. While this headquartersp resentedaunited front behind its admired commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower. itscompetence to plan and control operations in anything but the broadest sense waschallengeda t every turn by the air and ground commandersta skedt o fight the actualcampaign.This dissertation concludes that the "oversight" provided by the SupremeHeadquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, SHAEF, and its Supreme Commander.was not in tune with both operational realities and practices. and was not capable ofseizing opportunity and conducting a campaign of maneuver. During the actualexecution of MARKET GARDEN, the Allied Command system functioned poorlycausing the operation to fail by the narrowest margins. While MARKET GARDENhas often been portrayed as a failure of one man, of intelligence, or of poor planning,the coalition system and the men who ran it were not capable of fighting acomplicated battle efficiently because of their inability to function as a team, ratherthan as a band of brothers, the creation of which was the responsibility of the SupremeCommander.