The Commission’s internal conditions for social re-regulation: Market efficiency and wider social goals in setting the rules of financial services in Europe

摘要

With its scarce budgetary resources and institutional logics favouring market-based problemsolving,the European Union (EU) has been considered a prime example of the regulatorystate. When and how can we expect the Commission to pursue aims beyond the mere increaseof efficiency in private market transactions? Can we expect Brussels to intervene wheresocietal interests demand re-regulation?We draw up two ideal-type perspectives on market regulation and trace them empiricallyalong two regulatory processes concerning financial services: consumer credit regulation andequal treatment in financial services, selected as recent instruments focussing explicitly onpresumably weaker parts in market transactions. Regulatory decisions are reconstructed alongsemi-structured interviews with Commission officials from different DGs and hierarchicallevels conducted 2006-2009.In both cases the Commission went beyond mere market-efficiency and changed the qualityof the financial market by favouring disadvantaged societal groups in its regulatory proposals.Our process analyses suggest that there is a scope for a regulatory equality enhancing policywhich depends on pro-active agents within the Commission, the possibility to frameregulatory beneficiaries as market participants, and the re-distribution of rights instead ofresources.