Role for on-site chemical analysis to support CWC inspections.

摘要

The CWC, when it enters into force, will be unique among arms control treaties in the detail of its verification provisions. Each of the treaty provisions will, at least in principle, be monitored by on-site inspections classified as either routine or challenge. In either type of inspection, inspectors are allowed to collect physical samples for chemical analysis. Available analytical instruments have the resolution and the sensitivity to isolate, detect and identify chemical species present in concentrations of less than parts per trillion in many cases. These capabilities provide powerful tools for CWC inspectors. They also drastically increase the risk for compromise of sensitive information that is not relevant to the CWC. This information may deal with national security issues or confidential business issues. The challenge then is to strike the proper balance between the protection of legitimately sensitive information and providing adequate analytical support to CWC inspectors. The capabilities and limitations of sample collection and chemical analysis have been explored in a number of field experiments at both US government and US industrial facilities. The results of these experiments have led to a better appreciation of the risk to sensitive information and the generation and some testing of methods to prevent disclosure without unduly impacting the effectiveness of the inspection. This report summarizes results from these studies.