US/Russian affirmation process of the Russian fissile material container design

摘要

The US government agreed to provide the Russian Federation with containers to support the dismantlement of Russian nuclear weapons as part of the Nunn- Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program. In February 1996, the 'affirmation' of the Russian Fissile Material container design was completed. The 'affirmation' process allowed a joint program between the Russian and US governments to proceed without the exchange of sensitive weapons specific information. The Russian Fissile Material container program is an integral part of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program wherein the US government provides assistance to the states of the Former Soviet Union for dismantlement of their nuclear stockpile. The Cooperative Threat Reduction program is managed by the US Defense Special Weapons Agency. Sandia National Laboratories was selected as the design agency and technical point of contact for the Russian Federation. The Department of Energy, which certifies containers for weapons shipments in the US, provided an independent assessment of the Sandia designed container to assure that it met the requirements of the August 31, 1993 AT-4OOR Container Requirements (Sandia National Laboratories, 1993) document which was agreed to by representatives of the US and Russian Federation. The 'affirmation' process was undertaken in lieu of a certification process. This process was a formal review by the US Department of Energy of Sandia's design and testing of the Russian Fissile Material container. The affirmation was intended to provide the Russian Federation with assurance that the container met the negotiated requirements including specific sections of IAEA Safety Series 6 (IAEA, 1985). The process stopped short of a certification process that would have required weapons specific design information.