Technology and Friction in the Schlieffen Plan.

摘要

One of the principal reasons that Germany lost World War I was the failure of the Schlieffen Plan of 1905, its strategic scheme to knock France quickly out of the war. The plan involved a wide counter-clockwise sweep by the German right (Northern) flank through Belgium and Luxembourg and around Paris to outflank the French Army, which was concentrated in positions further south along the German-French border. The Germans then intended to surround and destroy the French Army in a 'decisive battle of encirclement and annihilation.' Success hinged on rapid mobilization as well as operational speed and concentration to resolve the issue quickly and the plan was utterly dependent on the railroads. In August 1914, the plan fell short. As a result. Germany had to fight a two-front war of attrition which eventually bled her into submission. The failure of the Schlieffen Plan can be traced to its neglect of many of Clausewitz's most basic principles. Yet interwoven throughout all of its shortcoming is another fundamental factor that Clausewitz did not discuss in great detail, but which contributed to each failure and carries enormous relevance to modern U.S. strategic military thought: excessive reliance on technology (i.e., the specific mechanical devices and the systems into which they are integrated into military operations). Thus, railroads include not only the trains, tracks, and other physical objects associated with transport, but also the mobilization schedules, staging plans, and other intangible elements that constitute the control system that enabled it to contribute to the military effort. Understood in this way, technology was related to nearly every instance in which the plan neglected key principles of Clausewitz. Thus paper explores the Clausewitzian weaknesses of Schlieffen's plan in light of technology, particularly the railroads, and suggests some lessons that apply today.