Origins of the Second Cold War.

摘要

In November 2002. the administration of President Cohn Powell was confronted with one of its worst strategic nightmares as a waking reality the massing of Russian military forces in the area bordering the Baltic nations and Poland, in direct response to the expansion of the NATO alliance to admit Poland and the Czech Republic as new members. Unable to resolve the crisis diplomatically, Powell and his key advisers faced two fundamental decisions during a pivotal meeting in the White House Situation Room first, could U.S. military force be used to deter or reverse a Russian advance into Poland or the Baltics, and second, assuming the capability existed, should U.S. forces be employed in an area where the U.S. had no vital interests at stake. A failure to act would almost surely sound the death knell for NATO, still reeling from the 1999 debacle in which some 1500 of its troops were killed or wounded after being caught in a flare-up of ethnic fighting between Hungary and Romania But U.S. and Allied military planners, forced to use Polish territory as a staging ground earlier than foreseen, confronted political and operational problems that cast some doubt on the ability to 'fight and win' In a supreme irony, the first crisis to test the new NATO was bringing pressure to bear directly on the weakest link of the alliance its newest untested member.