America at the 'Fork in the Road' to Vietnam.

摘要

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the United States' decision in early 1965 to escalate its involvement in Vietnam using the principles of Clausewitz as reference. The decision to escalate the U.S. commitment to the war in Vietnam was made by President Johnson over the period January to July 1965. Escalation was begun in two related phases, the first being the initiation of a sustained bombing campaign against various targets in North Vietnam. The second phase was the introduction of American combat ground forces, initially to protect the bases from which to stage the bombing raids, and then to conduct actual assault operations against Viet Cong units. The author asks the following questions: Do the theories expounded by Clausewitz over 150 years ago apply to the situation the United States faced in Vietnam. Do his military theories fit the reality of world events as the United States saw them in 1965. Could the nation have avoided the pitfalls of Vietnam if it had used Clausewitz as a guide. To assess the validity and applicability of Clausewitz to Vietnam in 1965, the author will address three basic questions: what was the nature of the war, what was its purpose, and how was it conducted.