Joint Targeting and the Joint Target Coordination Board: Let's Fix the CurrentDoctrine

摘要

This monograph discusses joint operational targeting and the Joint TargetCoordination Board (JTCB). Neither concept is new to the U.S. military, but joint doctrine has recently included specifics of the Joint Target Coordination Board. The question is, are the specifics of the JTCB doctrine adequate for commanders and staff planners. The important aspects of the JTCB are threefold; they include where the board should fit in the command structure, when it should enter the target planning cycle, and where the most appropriate staff is located to support the JTCB. To assess the doctrine, the monograph first reviews two historical case studies. The two case studies are the Southeast Asia War during the Rolling Thunder Campaign 1965-1968, and the Gulf War 1990-1991. Each case study looks at the theater command architecture, the theater joint targeting system, and the issues involved with joint targeting. There is a comparison of the issues from both studies at the end of the Gulf War case. The monograph then reviews current JTCB doctrine. This section reveals that current JTCB doctrine, as written, can either hurt or help the joint targeting process, depending on how it is implemented. Finally, the concluding section of the monograph offers recommendations on how the current doctrine can be changed to best facilitate joint operational targeting. The recommendations specify where the JTCB should fit in the joint command structure, when it should enter the planning cycle, and where the most appropriates staff is located to support it.