United States Army and Large Cities Prior to the Global War on Terror.

摘要

The United States Army has relied on a variety of doctrinal manuals for urban operations over the past 70 years. During this period, it conducted operations in Manila, Berlin, Tokyo, Seoul, Saigon, and Panama City, among other cities. While U.S. Army keystone doctrine has changed many times over the years to reflect new strategic contexts, urban doctrine has remained relatively static. In fact, U.S. Army urban doctrine has never effectively addressed the unique requirements and characteristics of operations in large cities (those with a population over 750,000). An analysis of the history of U.S. Army operations in large cities, considered in relation to relevant doctrine and theory, illustrates the longstanding flaws in the U.S. Army's doctrine and mission execution for urban areas. In addition, the Army's inability to integrate lessons learned from previous urban operations has been a significant obstacle to the improvement of U.S. Army doctrine for these operations. This analysis describes these challenges in detail, and provides recommendations for updating U.S. Army doctrine to address the special properties of urban environments, particularly large cities.