Seeing the Enemy: Have We Got It Right

摘要

An unstable global environment where the threat is ambiguous requires warfightersto recognize the difference and interrelationship between seeing and understanding the enemy. This monograph provides an alternative definition which emphasizes the difference between seeing and understanding the enemy and the commander's role. Accentuating the difference and linkage between seeing and understanding the enemy is important to mission execution and the development of Commander's Critical Information Requirements. This monograph examines the evolution and execution of Army doctrine during both combat and simulated combat operations to establish that there is a difference and linkage between seeing and understanding the enemy. The author uses the 24th Infantry Division's Task Force Smith and the 1st Marine Division's performance during the Korean War to demonstrate how seeing and understanding the enemy impacts on massing combat power at the decisive point. The monograph presents the argument that reoccurring training issues experienced at the Combat Training Centers are linked to the warfighter's inability to acknowledge the difference and linkage between seeing and understanding the enemy. Finally, the monograph analyzes technology's impact on the Army's ability to see and understand the enemy. Realizing that modern technology improves the commander's ability to see the enemy, the author then focuses on determining whether seeing the enemy is enough. Deployment demands and a wide variety of potential threats require the warfighter to recognize the difference and linkage between seeing and understanding the enemy. The difference is vital to mission accomplishment.