Joint Targeting Control, Compromise, or Coordination Board

摘要

Joint targeting is an extremely important and complex function which hasunderstandably resulted in inter-service rivalry. This conflict has historically manifested itself the creation of joint targeting boards. These boards, including the Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB) which emerged during OPERATION DESERT STORM, represent poor models for future Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) to use as a means of maximizing combat force capabilities. Cognizant of the diversity of combat environments, joint doctrine is deliberately vague on the formation, authority, methodology, and composition of the JTCB. Each of the services have developed their own perspective on the JTCB. These range from a vehicle to control joint air operations, to an ineffectual forum where senior leaders compromise on targets and the amount of planned close air support. The 'Decide, Detect, Deliver, and Assess' approach used by many JTCBs forces the board to concentrate on individual targets and target sets. The result is a JTCB focus below the operational level of war, bordering on a violation of decentralized execution. Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) require an effective means to ensure coordination and synchronization of theater forces. By adopting a modified version of the Strategy-To-Task (STT) Framework, JTCBs would concentrate on achieving the JFC's objectives through an operational analysis of major operations' tasks and functional commanders' objectives. An objectives-oriented JTCB could provide the critically needed forum where senior commanders articulate the status of each component's operational scheme within the JFC's overall operational idea, and explore possibilities for synchronization. The modified STT approach would encourage future JTCBs to focus on the operational level of war and the synergistic application of theater forces.