Analysis of the U.S. Navy's Goal-Based Awards System and Its Effect on Recruit Quality.

摘要

Commander Navy Recruiting Command (CNRC) has changed the Awards and Incentives System in recent years in an effort to increase recruiter productivity and promote recruit quality goal achievement. The latest Awards and Incentives System updates have placed increased emphasis on recruit quality in support of Navy Recruiting Command's strategic plan 'Recruit Force 2020.' This thesis provides a detailed overview of the current Navy Awards and Incentives System. The thesis also attempts to estimate the effect of specific awards on the quality of recruit contracts. Furthermore, the thesis estimates the effect of monthly goaling targets on the quality of recruits. The objective is to determine if the current Navy Awards and Incentives System has an unintended consequence of reducing recruit quality. The analysis tests whether recruiters sacrifice quality as the end of the month approaches to meet their monthly goaling deadline. Also, the analysis tests the impact of Gold Wreath awards on recruiter productivity and recruit quality. The results indicate that recruit quality tends to fall as the end-of-the-month approaches, specifically during the last week of the month. However, the results did not support the hypothesis that recruiters sacrifice quality to obtain their first Gold Wreath award.