Air Operations in Low Intensity Conflict. The Case of Chechnya

摘要

Recent conflicts in Chechnya and Bosnia indicate that for the immediate future, low intensity conflicts (LIC) will predominate over high- intensity Operation Desert Storm-type scenarios. The sober reality is that these skirmishes, according to Gen Charles Boyd, US Air Force, Retired, 'can not produce an enduring solution with military force--air or ground--only one that will last until it departs' and that 'a reliance on air power alone--the strike option--in this type of terrain with these kinds of targets has never held any real promise of conflict resolution.' Boyd's comments appear to hold for the conflict from December 1994 to August 1996 between Russian and Chechen rebel forces. Here, one of the combatants was a former superpower and the other a loose collection of rebels armed only with ground weapons. Against no credible air threat other than antiquated ZSU-23/4 air defense artillery, the Russian air force, while effective, was unable to make a major impact on the course and outcome of the fighting.