Attacking the Enemy's Will: The Dangers of Making Conflict Planning Too Simple

摘要

This monograph is about planning strategy for the conduct of militaryintervention. Using popular, but often misunderstood or misquoted theory from some of the most popular strategic theorists, this monograph attempts to dispel the myth that strategic planning for military intervention is as easy as applying a standard planning process. Because planning has transitioned to the use of planning processes, planners and strategists have become careless in their analysis of the enemy and the situation. The development of strategy has been replaced by an over-concern with the completion of the planning process. Rather than performing in-depth analysis of the enemy and situation to determine courses of action and develop carefully thought out objectives and strategy, accurate courses of action have been replaced by a philosophy of simply attacking the enemy's will with maximum force. The concern has become one of process rather than product. The purpose of this monograph is to define the concept of the enemy's will and explain the importance of understanding it; then, to demonstrate that importance using historical examples. The focus is about strategy: understanding will and its affect in warfare. Sun Tzu's quote on knowing the enemy is one of the oldest, yet the most applicable statements ever made about strategy and planning for armed conflict. Analysis of the enemy and analysis of friendly capabilities are the keys to developing a successful course of action to engage a belligerent force--therefore, analysis of the enemy and its will is the foundation to the development of intervention strategy. As Clausewitz points out, war is all about will, a battle or test of will--the ability to 'impose' will upon another entity. Fuller highlights the importance of considering that the enemy must be thought of as capable and surprising and reminds us that the enemy has a vote.