US and India Security-Economic Dilemma: A Study on the Effects of Relative Gain Sensitivities and Regime Formation.

摘要

This study analyzes the US-India security and economic regimes and challenges International Relations (IR) theoretical assumptions that states typically compete in security matters and cooperate in economic matters. Relative gain sensitivities directly influence international cooperation and competition and are products of the international order, regional influences, and state interactions. Analyzing the US-India relationship during two distinct periods, 1991-2001 and 2001-2014, proves this assertion. Three major conclusions arise from this study. First, mixed-motive interactions exist across a discord-harmony continuum based on levels of barriers and agreement resulting from state preferences. The barriers and agreement determine relative gain sensitivities and result in Negative, Positive, or Neutral regime classifications. Second, states have failed to acknowledge the unique expectations that accompany the emergent multipolar international order comprised of regional multipolar subsets. In doing so, states adhere to old international order expectations and misinterpret political action, which results in faulty or misdirected policy. These preliminary conclusions lead to the third conclusion that the US and India require an Accelerated Interaction course of action. Accelerated interaction capitalizes on formalized economic mechanisms to reduce relative gain sensitivities and enhance the US-India economic regime. An enhanced economic regime and understanding of the contemporary international order allows the states to combine their efforts in the Western Indian Ocean Region (WIOR). The WIOR presents a focus area of lower barriers and higher agreement possibilities for the states to reap the greatest joint benefits. The security and economic welfare of the contemporary international order demands this type of leadership from the largest and oldest democracies in the international order.