Information Warfare's Missing Quarterback: The Case for a Joint Force Information Warfare Component Commander

摘要

The synergistic success of Information Warfare (IW) during Operation Desert Storm marked the birth of coordinated strategic and operational IW. Ironically, Desert Storm's 'textbook application' of IW has prevented subsequent joint IW operations from reaching their full potential and has hindered further IW organizational improvements. Challenging future joint operations are a diminishing military budget that is producing a smaller, interservice dependent force. Exacerbating the situation is the application of Desert Storm lessons learned, by potential adversaries, to their command and control systems. No longer can operational IW rely upon tactical redundancy to overcome ad hoc planning; the joint force commander (JFC) must get it right the first time. As a result of the Gulf War's robust application of IW, today's Commander in Chief (CINC) and joint force commander (JFC) can mistakenly think the current IW planning process promotes multiservice unity of effort. However, available methods to organize for the joint IW effort traditionally produce a powerless IW commander that plans and executes single dimension operations. To reap force multiplying effects that full spectrum IW can offer, the JFC must delegate sufficient coordinating authority and provide clear planning guidance to his IW commander. Unfortunately, current IW organization methods also fail to provide a reliable integrated planning process that allows seamless coordination across service boundaries. Implementation of a Joint Force Information Warfare Component Commander (JFIWCC) provides the IW commander with the authority to resolve current planning problems and execute multifaceted IW operations. The JFIWCC can compose the IW story' and ensure its exacting performance--ultimately allowing the JFC to operate inside the adversary's decision cycle.