De-Alerting the U.S. and Russian Nuclear Arsenals: An Unlikely Method of Arms Control

摘要

Non-governmental organizations and observers have suggested that deteriorating conditions in Russia's nuclear weapons system could lead Russian decision-makers to order a nuclear missile launch on warning, thereby precipitating nuclear war between the United States and Russia. A proposed de-alerting measures would either disable the nuclear launch platforms or the missiles, thus extending the time required for launching an ICBM or SLBM. The thesis suggests that the proposed de-alerting methods are physically feasible but could have detrimental effects upon crisis stability and national security. Verifying de-alerting measures also presents additional problems. The assumptions employed by de-alerting proponents are inaccurate, and their scenarios are implausible. Other arms control methods are being pursued (such as U.S.-Russian cooperation in jointly operated early warning centers) that should be more effective at reducing the chances of an accidental nuclear exchange while preserving Russian and American national security.