Calling the Sino-Soviet Split

摘要

Once it was widely believed that the USSR and Communist China were firm allies acting in concert to spread Communist influence everywhere they could in the world. In the early 1950s, there was much to support that image. Mao Tse-tungs regime had triumphed in China and then allied itself formally with the Soviet Union. Communist North Korea had invaded the Republic of Korea. Communist China had intervened massively in that war. The USSR had provided its Communist allies with military assistance, including Soviet-piloted MiGs. The trouble was, among US policymakers such an image of Sino-Soviet solidarity persisted long after the Moscow-Beijing relationship had in fact begun to fray badly. Furthermore, that image persisted long after officers from various CIA units had begun to alert consumers that a Sino-Soviet break was definitely developing. Not all CIA officers were of one mind: some remained reluctant to change their long-held view of Communist bloc solidarity. All in all, however, the dominant voice of CIA analysts was out in front of the rest of the Intelligence Community (IC) in trying to alert policymaking consumers that the United States might someday face a significantly changed strategic situation. This article treats the highlights of that Sino-Soviet story: the judgments CIA officers made in the years up to 1963, by which time estrangement between Moscow and Beijing had become publicly evident; why these CIA officers came to hold those particular views; what they were up against in trying to promote their heresy amidst many policymakers who remained true believers; and the impact these CIA officers' judgments had or did not have on policymakers.