Smaller-Scale Contingencies and Army Force Structure: Are We Set Up for Long Term Success.

摘要

The recent Presidential campaign highlighted the differences between the Clinton Administration and the Bush campaign on the subject of smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs). On the one hand, the Clinton administration used military forces for a wide variety of missions to further US interests. This was not a course of action particularly popular within the military, who thought their mission was to fight and win the nation's wars, not to be a relief organization with weapons. After all, our strategy was to fight and win two MTWs near simultaneously. The Bush campaign promised to end the perceived misuse of American forces and would close out its participation in long, resource intensive SSC operations like Bosnia and Kosovo. Political realities both at home and abroad, however, have forced the new Bush administration to rethink its campaign promise in this regard. The recently released Quadrennial Defense Review was characterized as modifying the two MTW scenario as a force shaping construct and has instead decided on a capabilities based approach that, among other things, postulates the continuation of SSCs for years into the future. Since it is apparent that these types of operations will continue, the problem arises as to how we will successfully execute these missions over the long term. How do we need to organize Army forces to handle the full spectrum of operations and reduce the stress on our low density/high deployment assets. What are the options. Do we limit the number of SSCs we can get involved in. Do we create a constabulary force that specializes in SSCs. Or do we merely modify the mix of units available to the Active Army to enable it to meet current and future missions.