Air Superiority by the Numbers: Cutting Combat Air Forces in a Time of Uncertainty.

摘要

The central goal of this thesis is to identify and articulate the risks associated with a small combat air force (CAF). The author compares and contrasts the fighter force of today with that of the force employed during the Gulf War of 1991. Dramatic differences in the size, composition and readiness of today s air superiority fighter force illuminate significant strategic vulnerabilities associated with fighting major theater war. Using the variables of total fighter force size, air superiority force availability, fighter pilot availability and realistic combat training levels, the author provides a realistic assessment of the following question. If the CAF were called to fight a force similar in capabilities to the Iraq Air Defense System of 1991, could we do it and at what cost? Comparing the size of the total fighter force against the Persian Gulf wartime requirement, today s CAF would suffer from a lack of strategic depth and forward presence. Fighter pilot manning and low readiness levels exacerbate the problems of a small CAF, leading the author to conclude that while the CAF could fight a major theater war, the strategic costs associated with committing such a large proportion of the force would preclude the US from maintaining its global security commitments. These costs may dissuade policy makers from using the CAF for its intended purpose projecting combat airpower for national security.