Achieving Operational Deception in the Age of CNN

摘要

Because operational deception relies heavily on secrecy to achieve objectives, intuitively it would seem that deception plans cannot succeed in the presence of the news media. Quite the opposite is true. Not only can it exist under the watchful eyes of the media, but in some cases it requires the presence of the press to be successful. The news media affects the different deception methodologies in various ways. Use of visual display deception, such as decoys, requires almost complete control of the area of implementation with respect to reporters because it is vulnerable to direct observation. Non-visual display techniques, however, such as simulated radio traffic, electronic emitters, and thermal signature generators, will likely withstand the direct scrutiny of journalists. Ruses tend to be fairly secure, as the commander controls exactly what misleading information is exposed to the adversary's intelligence collection systems. Demonstration practices in factor space, like feints, are more at risk in the presence of reporters as they are designed to mislead the enemy as to the physical location of a future military event, i.e., they are susceptible to the visible observation of journalists. Demonstration activities conducted in factor time, those actions designed to deceive the adversary as to the timing of a military event, are relatively secure, absent the disclosure of the commander's true intent. Although the commander must avoid misleading the news media in a manner that would influence US leadership or the American public, it has become acceptable practice to allow the news media to come to false conclusions about operational plans and intentions that deceive the enemy leadership. In such instances, the press becomes an almost indispensable part of operational deception.