Heating Up the Argument -- A Look at Friction and the Soundness of the Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) Concept

摘要

One goal of the United States (US) is a capabilities-based joint force designed to quickly achieve success along the continuum of conflict ranging from peace operations to war. In support of this goal, US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) authors crafted an integrated Joint Operational War-fighting (JOW) on 15 August 2002. This concept based upon emerging 'Effects-Based Operations' (EBO) and Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) concepts. The JOW concept desires a quick and decisive solution, one in which the enemy submits to a rapid strike of superior joint force against critical nodes of an opponent. This concept of using overwhelming power to be decisive is not new-it reflects our US military culture. Consequently, the question to ask is 'what is different.' One thing that is different about the emerging RDO concept is the growing belief and acceptance that enhancements in information technology will enable joint planners to rapidly assess and rapidly adapt plans to correspond to changing situations. As a result, the JOW concept suggests that commanders and staffs at the operational level can quickly gain situational awareness and thus develop solutions to operational problems faster than the enemy thus rendering the enemy's actions more predictable and easier to counter. Is this working hypothesis valid. Will decisions for employment of combat power based on more information, quickly shared among more services and agencies enable the US military to rapidly and decisively defeat its opponent. This monograph examined the soundness of RDO concept for full spectrum operations at the operational level of war. Using 'friction' as an overarching evaluation criterion, this paper first determined that the concept's definition is imprecise and can create contusion. Second, it determined the concept's suitability for full-spectrum operations is suspect.