Open Source Intelligence - Doctrine's Neglected Child

摘要

Of the seven intelligence disciplines, OSINT is least appreciated, understood, or employed by staffs and organizations supporting the operational commander despite past successes at the strategic and tactical levels. These staffs and organizations tend to favor classified collection methods and information, and neglect to consider and integrate OSINT into their efforts. The causes of this neglect are many, ranging from previously mentioned predisposition toward classified intelligence sources to the technical challenge of information excess that overloads the users with irrelevant information. Nonetheless, the main reason stems from inadequate joint doctrine on OSINT. Existing joint doctrine recognizes OSINT's value, but provides little guidance on employment. Additionally, doctrinal coverage is minimal relative to the other intelligence disciplines - suggestive of lesser value, and dissuading meaningful allocation of resources to OSINT. It is time to reconsider OSINT as an operational intelligence force and resource multiplier, and revise doctrine to reflect on the growing importance of OSINT in the all-source analysis process. Doctrine can no longer be vague; it must provide guidance to encourage meaningful allocation of resources to OSINT.