Doctrine Development Process in the Kenya Army: Bridging the Gap.

摘要

The use of military doctrine as a basis for preparing armies for war is evident throughout military history. It dates back to as early as 350 B.C, when Sun Tzu advanced the fifth factor of war, the laws and regulations, which was subsequently translated to mean doctrine. However, to date doctrine remains a term with various definitions, descriptions, and interpretations. These varied definitions and interpretations, have not only caused terminological confusion between doctrine and other related terms; concepts and doctrine, but also caused confusion in their applications. This confusion often results in a flawed doctrine development process. The Kenya Army currently prescribes to maneuver warfare as a basis of its doctrine. However, while maneuver warfare may appeal to many military organizations, consensus has not been reached to either classify maneuver warfare as doctrine, an operational concept, or an operational approach. The purpose of this thesis is therefore, to analyze the Kenya Army doctrine development process with a view to recommending a viable and an enduring doctrine development process. A major finding of this thesis is that a viable and an enduring doctrine development process has to begin with the establishment of a capable lead organization. The organization must eliminate terminological and utility confusion among doctrine, concepts, and principles. It must broadly follow three doctrine development phases: the collection/information gathering phase; the formulation and validation phase; and the promulgation and dissemination phase. The research's major recommendation is for the KDF to establish a joint doctrine organization which is capable of eliminating terminological and utility confusion between doctrine and other related terms. The organization must remain guided by the three broad doctrinal phases as established by this research.