How Much Is Enough. Sizing the Deployment of Baggage Screening Equipment to Minimize the Cost of Flying. Executive Summary

摘要

Prior to 9/11 there were repeated and widely publicized examples of contraband (e.g., guns or knives) passing through the carry-on baggage screening stations without being detected. Even though the terrorists of 9/11 did not take banned weapons onto the hijacked aircraft (box cutters were permitted at the time), the call for better screening of all baggage was an immediately reaction. In response to the 9/11 attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Congress mandated that all bags carried onto aircraft be inspected for various contraband (e.g., bombs). Inspection stations already existed for carry-on luggage, but baggage checked at the ticket counter was inspected only on international flights. Assessments by RAND and others indicated that even under optimistic assumptions, an inadequate number of machines would be available by December 2002 (see Reference 1). Moreover, the anticipated growth in demand for travel over this decade would likely result in substantial passenger delays at the airports. To avoid such delays in the future, the size of the Electronic Detection System (EDS) acquisition would need to be nearly double the original estimate made immediately after 9/11. And because airports were never designed with security needs in mind, additional infrastructure would be needed to accommodate the new equipment at many airports.