Airpower versus a Fielded Force: Misty FACs of Vietnam and A-10 FACs of Kosovo - A Comparative Analysis

摘要

Since World War II, the United States has been involved in several limited conflicts against smaller, far less militarily capable opponents. Unlimited war with the Soviet Union, for which USAF prepared for more than 40 years, never materialized. Instead, US airpower has generally been directed against underdeveloped, authoritarian states. Such regimes tend to rely upon their armies as their primary source of power. Yet USAF, borne out of the aerial combat experience of World War II, has firmly held to airpower as the means of bypassing military forces and striking directly at the vital center of the enemy. Thus, American Airmen are predisposed to discounting the effectiveness of air attack against fielded forces. The realities of modern conflict, however, have dictated the need for direct attack on armies. Airmen with little previous training or doctrine have improvised tactics to use the equipment at hand to get the job done. This study examines two such groups of Airmen-the Misty forward air controllers (FAC) of Vietnam from 1967 to 1970 and the A-10 FACs over Kosovo in 1999. A comparison of the Misty and A-10 FAC missions clearly demonstrates a failure of the USAF to develop a full range of suitable tactics for the direct attack of enemy fielded forces. Although the quantum leaps in weapons delivery accuracy from Vietnam to Kosovo now make it possible to destroy armor and artillery from the air, there has not been a corresponding improvement in target identification. Until USAF prioritizes the direct attack of ground forces and target identification, its ability to attack fielded forces effectively will remain limited. Drawing from the lessons of the Misty and A-10 FACs, the recommendations presented here focus on equipment, tactics and training, and doctrine.