New RC: Will It Please Anyone

摘要

To their credit, the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the Army Reserve (USAR) have proposed sweeping changes to make their components capable of meeting future Army requirements. Predictions for those future requirements come from a variety of Department of Defense (DoD) offices and envision a near- to mid-term strategic environment requiring constant mobilization at levels less than, but near, those currently experienced. In turn, the ARNG and USAR know they cannot meet that need unless significant changes are made to their force structure, training, and mobilization process. Central to their proposed changes is the notion of a rotational force. Shortly after unveiling their respective 6- and 5-year rotational plans, the ARNG and USAR began receiving a variety of objections. These objections correctly recognize that, for the plans to succeed, all of DoD must discipline itself to use the Reserve Components (RC) within some severe parameters. These parameters are necessary for the RC to introduce sufficient predictability into their force to manage it effectively. The most troublesome parameter for the RC plans concerns the approximate number and duration of troops they can provide. Another parameter is resource commitment. The RC requires a rapid transition to its new force structure and training plan. The current degraded condition of the RC requires immediate identification of the units that need to be ready to deploy next year, the year after, and the year after that. The plans require immediate resources to redesign, equip, and train those near-term rotations. Finally, the RC plans depend on politically sensitive changes in mobilization policy. The highly touted system of using volunteers early in the mobilization process is politically palatable, but if unchanged, would wreak havoc on the RC rotational force.