Analysis of Proposed Fee-for-Service Fund (FFS) Implementation in the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA)

摘要

The purpose of this MBA Project was to investigate and provide a comprehensive overview of the implementation of a Fee For Service (FFS) structure for the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA). The goal of the project was to identify and document the applicability of a FFS in DCMA by comparing the seemingly redundant services provided by both the Program Management Offices (PMOs) and DCMA. Furthermore, the project analyzed the potential cost savings of a FFS achieved by forcing the PMO to pay for the services themselves vice utilizing DCMA as a free service provider. The authors' contention is not that DCMA is inefficient, but that the system for identifying, procuring, and funding DCMA's services is inefficient. The project was motivated by the authors' collective personal and professional experience. Their initial research has been consolidated into the following analysis questions: (1) Do non-value added inefficiencies and redundancies exist in DCMA's performance of contract management functions; (2) If inefficient redundancies exist, would a FFS structure reduce these inefficient redundancies, thus improving the return on investment for the Agency's stakeholders. The authors analyze eight programs (three from the Air Force, two from the Navy, and three from the Army) by comparing the staffing of the PMO to that of the DCMA PST. The comparison evaluates redundant tasking (if any) being performed by both the PMO and the PSTs from DCMA. For example, does the engineer and the earned value management specialist provided by DCMA perform identical functions to the engineering staff of the PMO. The eight programs evaluated are the Tomahawk Cruise Missile and the F/A/EA-18G aircraft (Navy); the F-22 Raptor, C-130J, and C-17 aircraft (Air Force); and the Patriot Missile (PAC III), Theater High Altitude Area Defense System (THAADS), and the Standard Missile (Army).