War Termination Planning for Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom: Failures to Set the Conditions for a Stable Peace

摘要

Historically, the United States has inadequately planned for, and poorly set the conditions for, successful war termination. Operations DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM serve as two recent examples in which civil and military leaders at the national and theater strategic levels of war failed to link national objectives with clear, timely policy guidance and sufficient resources to enable the commander at the operational level to set the conditions for a stable peace. During Operation DESERT STORM, the ambiguity of the objective 'promote the safety and stability of the Persian Gulf' led to missed opportunities to influence the postwar settlement and possible regime change and produced the residual effect of increased Islamic extremism. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the lack of planning between the Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of State (DOS) led to an inadequate command structure and insufficient number of ground forces to effectively provide security and stability once major combat operations ended. These examples show that planning for war termination should begin as early as possible and must be an interagency, multinational, and integrated effort. To ensure that this occurs, legislation is needed to force interagency planning for Phase IV Governance, Stability and Support Operations while also establishing a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) for each Combatant Command (COCOM) to facilitate the interagency planning and coordination process. Joint Doctrine must also be updated to include the role of the National Security Council (NSC) in the war termination process and redefine the role of the military in Phase IV operations.