Fear and Loathing in the Air: Combat Fear and Stress in the Air Force

摘要

This thesis is about the Air Force's organizational response to acute combat fear and stress -- past and present. Despite the practical experience of dealing with this issue from World War II to Vietnam, the Air Force's response has become muddled in recent years. Anecdotal evidence indicates that some airmen have proven unable or unwilling to do their duty in the air, but little data exist to corroborate the stories or record the response. To answer a series of related questions about the genesis and state of the Air Force's organizational response to acute combat fear and stress, the author has divided this study into four parts: an examination of the related literature on combat stress; a review of the Air Force's actions in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam; a look at the actors and policies that form the contemporary organizational response; and a report on the formulation and results of the Combat Stress Survey -- an instrument designed to provide contemporary data on the subject. The study demonstrates that the Air Force's organizational response to combat fear and stress has been a combination of medical and administrative policies designed to balance the needs of affected pilots with the warfighting demands of the Air Force. Unfortunately, there is little balance in the current approach to the issue. Survey results indicate that commanders -- the first line of defense -- have proven unwilling to take long-term administrative actions in the aftermath of stark failures. The Air Force needs to confront this issue with discussion, Air Force-wide policy, and education so that commanders have the requisite tools and knowledge to deal with a problem that is likely to return in future conflicts.