British Colonial Experience in Waziristan and Its Applicability to Current Operations

摘要

When developing the best course of action to accomplish its goals in Waziristan, the U.S. can look to the British colonial experience to help guide its actions. The British dealt extensively with Waziristan from 1849-1947. This monograph concludes that the U.S. must accomplish its goals in Waziristan through interagency operations. The U.S. should shape the environment as discreetly as possible and let the Pakistani government deny and disrupt Al- Qaeda and Taliban activities in Waziristan. The British colonial experience demonstrated overt military operations do not guarantee any success in Waziristan and will likely increase the chance of unleashing events that could remove Musharraf and possibly place nuclear weapons into the hands of Islamic extremists or military hardliners. Musharraf is not a model democratic leader, but he is better than the alternatives in Pakistan; the U.S. should not do anything to imperil his hold on power. The possible consequences of his removal outweigh any benefit that unilateral or overt military operations might achieve, perhaps even the capture of killing Osama bin Ladin.