Japanese Maritime Thought: If Not Mahan, Who

摘要

The late Colonel John Boyd,who knew a thing or two about strategic thought, was fond of declaring that excellence in warfare and other human endeavors depended on people, ideas, and hardware-in that order. We postulate that Japan has lost sight of this commonsense axiom, allowing strategic thought to atrophy. If so, this decline in strategic thought could impede Tokyo's ability to act outside the confines of the U.S.-Japanese security alliance as it might need to, given the rise of an increasingly capable, seapower-minded China and mounting frictions between Beijing and Tokyo. We ask the following questions to assess the state of strategic thinking in Japan's naval forces: - Why does maritime strategy matter now, in an increasingly interconnected world. Does economic interdependence eliminate the resort to power politics; - How did Alfred Thayer Mahan view seapower and its uses. How much influence did Mahan exert in imperial Japan; - How strictly did the Imperial Japanese Navy adhere to Mahan's theories, and, when it departed from Mahanian theory, why did it do so, and with what impact; - How much continuity was there in strategic thinking between the Imperial Japanese Navy and the Maritime Self-Defense Force. What impact did any shifts in strategic thought have; - Which strategic theorists do Japanese naval officials consult when they are grappling with vexing issues. If not Mahan, whom. - If indeed strategic thought has languished in postwar Japan's maritime forces, how might political and military leaders revive it. To which strategic theorists should they look. We close with a few observations and policy recommendations for Tokyo's naval establishment. Given the preliminary nature of this inquiry, we leave the article somewhat open-ended, in hopes of starting a sorely needed debate in Japanese and American naval circles rather than supplying answers that are likely to be premature.