To Integrate or to Deconlict, that is the Question: An Examination of Contemporary Challenges in Conventional and Special Operations Forces Command and Control

摘要

Evidence from recent operations suggests that current joint and USSOCOM doctrine are producing command and control (C2) arrangements between conventional forces (CF) and special operations forces (SOF) that are dysfunctional at the tactical level and counter-productive in achieving operational objectives. Operations Restore Hope, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom each reveal the dangers of attempting to integrate C2 between SOF and CF at the operational level, but failing to do so at the tactical level. To address current threats effectively, the U.S. military would be wise to reverse this approach. In the global campaign against ideological extremist insurgency, SOF best leverage their counter-terrorism, foreign internal defense, special reconnaissance, and unconventional warfare skills by focusing on Phase 0 shaping operations in the arc of instability. In counterinsurgency environments such as Afghanistan and Iraq, priority of mission should go to CF efforts, and joint force commanders should integrate SOF with CF at the tactical level to prevent compromising this effort. The Joint Staff and USSOCOM can facilitate this by modifying joint doctrine to permit SOF and CF C2 integration at the tactical level and revising joint education curricula and training opportunities to include exercising this integration. Until USSOCOM does so, it will exacerbate rather than resolve one of the primary problems that led to its creation: parochial interests compromising unity of effort while in the pursuit of national security objectives.