Concept at the Crossroads: Re-Thinking the Center of Gravity

摘要

Since the 1980s, the U.S. military has placed great emphasis on the theories and concepts of Carl von Clausewitz. Concomitantly, a tremendous emphasis has been placed in military doctrine on the consideration of a center of gravity (COG) as a central element of campaign planning. The doctrinal definitions of the COG are still imperfect, but the concept arguably serves as an effective tool for focusing military effort to win decisively in major operations or campaigns. Although the American military performs brilliantly in decisive operations, the difficulties it has faced in Iraq and Afghanistan suggest that a doctrinal renaissance is in order. This project examines the potential for employing the COG concept beyond the realm of decisive operations. After examining the concept's evolution, present doctrinal manifestation and some previous proposals for future employment, the study reveals that the COG's role in American military thinking is flawed and must be reconsidered entirely. To that end, three options are offered for evolving the COG, with a specific recommendation that it would be most effective if removed from doctrine and considered as an abstract, rather than practical, concept.