Emerging Requirements for U.S. Counterinsurgency: An Examination of the Insurgency in the Niger River Delta Region

摘要

Since early 2002, the U.S. military has relearned counterinsurgency (COIN) at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war for both special operations and conventional forces to meet the security and stability requirements of both Afghanistan and Iraq after major combat operations ceased. While the U.S. military is now developing a comprehensive COIN strategy and practice suitable to the specific requirements of those theaters, variations of insurgency are growing, or are already established, in areas of the world critical to U.S. national security interests. These insurgencies are wholly dissimilar from the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns. The evolving insurgency in the Niger River Delta region of Nigeria is and will continue to threaten U.S. national security interests in terms of regional political stability and access to strategic resources. This thesis proposes that the U.S. military's experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq -- both at the tactical and operational levels -- have not established an adequate skill set to overcome the challenges of COIN presented in the Niger River Delta. The U.S. military will require changes in service doctrine, organization, training, material, and leader development to prevail in this unique COIN environment.