Examining the Effectiveness of SWET and the Sons of SWET in OIF

摘要

The transition from combat to stability operations has been difficult for the U.S. Coalition forces in Iraq. One method used by the 1st Cavalry Division in 2004 was to develop logical lines of operations that provided units with methods and guidance to accomplish key tasks in the stability operations phase. Under the essential services line of operations, a concept that was implemented to help 'win the hearts and minds' of the local Iraqi people was the sewage, water, electricity, and trash program, also known as SWET. SWET became known as the primary focus for not only rebuilding and improving key infrastructure, but was perceived as the solution to winning the peace in Iraq. The SWET metrics program was adopted by follow-on units and was executed all over Iraq. The SWET metrics were constantly monitored by higher headquarters and were even utilized to predict the level of pacification and acceptance of the local population. The purpose of this monograph is to determine how effective SWET was when being utilized during counterinsurgency operations in Iraq. This will be accomplished by conducting a historical comparison with a similar infrastructure rebuilding program in Vietnam, examining the different modifications made to SWET by follow-on units, and analyzing the opinions of local Iraqis within each province about how they were affected by the U.S. Coalition forces' execution of full spectrum operations. The monograph will prove that the SWET concept alone is not the ideal framework for the entire country. SWET and the 'Sons of SWET' concepts are not enough to accomplish stability, dislodge insurgents from the populace, address the underlying causes of insurgency, or win the support of the local population. SWET is a concept that must be used along with other counterinsurgency strategies to accomplish these goals.