Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Assessment of Iraqi Security Forces' Units as Independent Not Clear Because ISF Support Capabilities Are Not Fully Developed

摘要

Since January 2006, GAO has been assessing three support capabilities that all the aforementioned reports have cited in whole or in part as being key to the ISF's achieving independence. Those three capabilities are logistics, command and control, and intelligence. The first of our reports, issued in March 2007, presented our preliminary observations on the Iraqi Security Forces' support capabilities as of August 2006. In those reports we noted that significant challenges had to be overcome before the ISF attained self-sufficiency. Those challenges included developing an effective logistics infrastructure to support the Iraqi military and police; training Iraqi logisticians and communications and intelligence specialists; maintaining vehicles and equipment; and developing policies and procedures within the ministries. In light of the continuing broad congressional interest in Iraq, we have undertaken this follow-on engagement under the authority of the Comptroller General to conduct evaluations at his own initiative to examine in more detail the progress achieved in the development of these capabilities. Specifically, our objectives were to determine: (1) what progress has been made toward the development of Iraqi Security Forces' logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities, and what factors have affected further progress; and (2) to what extent can DOD reports that ISF units are capable of fully independent operations be supported. This report is one of a series of products that GAO has produced since June 2004 addressing the security situation in Iraq and the ISF.