Reflections on the Integration of Black and White Space

摘要

Historically, the concept of black and white space has been defined by the interplay between the fear of another Pearl Harbor and the fear of expansionist communism. Two imperatives formed the foundation upon which the concept was built. The first imperative was to prevent strategic surprise. The second imperative was to establish and maintain the military capability to defeat a nuclear armed peer adversary. However, the implementation of the concept depended upon which imperative took precedence. The two implementations came to be identified by their classification levels. The systems supporting the new discipline of 'strategic reconnaissance,' which was focused on preventing nuclear war and strategic surprise, were highly classified and therefore called 'black.' The more tactically and operationally oriented systems such as those oriented towards bomb damage assessment were called 'white.' The two implementations also had different technical needs. On the one hand, the systems identified as strategic had to provide details on potential adversaries' strengths, weaknesses, and preparations for war; data latencies on the order of days to weeks were tolerable in most cases. On the other hand, the systems identified as tactical were much more focused on perishable data where speed took precedence. Because, 'Eisenhower was concerned with preventing nuclear war, not waging it,' the first space capability, CORONA, was focused on strategic reconnaissance -- it was 'black.' The integration of black and white space has been the 'holy grail' of the DoD from the inception of the space age. 'Washington has devoted so much attention to fixing that problem that other vital uses for satellite data have been shortchanged.' The author contends that the conditions that led to the black/white framework no longer exist, and that the black/white frame of reference is worse than irrelevant; it is an impediment to progress.