Standing the Test of Time: Revising the British Army's Counterinsurgency Doctrine

摘要

The recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan confirm the fundamental validity of the British Army's counterinsurgency doctrine, but offer lessons which should be incorporated into a doctrinal review. The current British Army's counterinsurgency doctrine, revised in July 2001, defines clearly the British neo-classic Western approach to counterinsurgency. It is rooted in the history of the Malayan Emergency, one that emphasizes minimum force, the rule of law, the importance of intelligence-led operations, civil- military cooperation, and tactical adaptability and agility. The events since 9/11 and operations in Iraq and Afghanistan lead those within the military community to call for a review of counterinsurgency doctrine. But is there a reason to challenge this view. Do the experiences of Southern Iraq and Afghanistan mean that the British Army's principles are now outdated and that the ideas of Sir Robert Thompson and General Sir Frank Kitson are too reminiscent of 50-year-old rubber plantations and a shrinking Empire. This paper will examine whether the British Army's counterinsurgency doctrine requires revision in light of recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. The current doctrine's principles and approach have stood up to the test of complex operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, circumstances for which they were not envisaged. This is because at the operational level counterinsurgency remains a competition between several sides, each seeking to mobilize the population to its cause. However, there are a number of areas that could be revised to make the doctrine more applicable and more relevant to today's insurgencies. Key areas for improvement involve understanding the information dimension, diagnosing the character of the insurgency, and enabling the multiple agencies involved in counterinsurgency.