Balancing Government Risks with Contractor Incentives in Performance- Based Logistics Contracts.

摘要

The use of Performance-Based Logistics (PBL) as a sustainment strategy for weapon systems has been mandated by the Department of Defense (DoD) and largely embraced by acquisition and contracting professionals in both government and private industry. Despite its apparent success, there is an inherent conflict that DoD implementers of PBL often face: the PBL goal of developing long-term partnerships that encourage investment from commercial partners is best achieved through lengthy, guaranteed contracts -- but such contracts increase the DoD's risk in an environment that is intended to transfer more risk to the contractor. This research examines issues associated with the type and length of PBL contracts between DoD organizations and private industry. The thesis addresses the question of how the DoD can ideally balance PBL contracts to mitigate operational and financial risks while simultaneously building long-term partnerships that encourage investment from commercial contractors. The results reveal five main areas in which the government should focus its efforts to improve PBL implementation.