Political Context Behind Successful Revolutionary Movements, Three Case Studies: Vietnam (1955-63), Algeria (1945-62), and Nicaragua (1967-79)

摘要

Contrary to the wave of euphoria following the collapse of the Soviet Empire, the new world order did not bring about a closure of revolutionary warfare. In fact, the Soviet-inspired wars of liberation against imperialism have been eclipsed by reactionary, jihadist wars. By all indications in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Somalia, and Iraq, Islamic militants have embraced revolutionary warfare, although not Mao's People's War model. In view of this assumption, a study of revolutionary warfare is apt because the conflict between the West and radical jihadism with continue to take place in dysfunctional, collapsing, or failed states. Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Mitten examines the extent to which some states create the conditions for revolutionary movements to flourish. Employing Jeff Goodwin's analytical framework for exploring the political context behind revolutionary movements, Lieutenant Colonel Mitten explores how the governments in Vietnam (1955-63), Algeria (1945-62), and Nicaragua (1967-79) unintentionally empowered revolutionary movements, resulting in these governments' demise. He supplements Goodwin's framework by including an examination of the insurgent leadership's political-military acumen. Lieutenant Colonel Mitten extrapolates the political- military lessons from these conflicts to suggest that the United States should minimize the level and type of assistance to states fighting in an insurgency because these states possess greater advantages than previously supposed. The reader with find his analysis compelling. Often, examining failure provides greater enlightenment than examining success. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this insightful monograph as a topic of debate among counterinsurgency specialists and the Department of Defense.