China's Electronic Long-Range Reconnaissance

摘要

Since 2005, Chinese cyber attacks against U.S. systems have increased at an alarming rate. However, the term attack carries unwanted connotations; these unwarranted incursions are more likely reconnaissance missions to collect intelligence on U.S. military systems, to spot vulnerabilities or plant trap-doors or viruses in our systems, and to ensure that China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) has an immediate advantage in the event of war involving America and China. If the incursions were attacks, then our systems would be down and destroyed. Instead, these computer reconnaissance measures appear to conform to an old Chinese stratagem: a victorious army first wins and then seeks battle. A defeated army first battles and then seeks victory. Reconnaissance via computer to spot vulnerabilities. The United States, of course, is not the only country accusing the Chinese of unwarranted incursions. Germany, England, France, Japan, Taiwan, Australia, and others have also been Chinese targets. When one views these events in the light of open- source accounts of Chinese information operations (IO) theory over the past several years, there is much circumstantial evidence to find China guilty as accused. The only actual forensic evidence, of course, is classified and located in the security agencies of the countries. This article explains Chinese military thought that supports their cyber attack activities. While other articles focus on who was attacked and how many times, this article focuses more on the theory behind the attacks, especially the PLA's use of electronic stratagems for their computer network operations and the use of surrogates such as patriotic hacker groups. The article reviews Chinese incursions since 2005 and examines open-source assessments provided by some of the most important Chinese information warfare theorists.