Airpower and the Establishment of Sea Control in an Anti-Access Environment; Final rept

摘要

The Taiwan Straits issue is a point of strategic, operational, and tactical priority for the U.S. Armed Forces. The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act expresses U.S. interests in the Western Pacific, stating that the United States would view attempts 'to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.' Due to the PRC's ongoing modernization and development of asymmetric weapons, any future U.S. military engagement with the PRC in support of Taiwan may incur significant operational risk. Thus, the qualities of land-based airpower must be leveraged to establish sea control in anti-access environments such as the Taiwan Straits in order to meet operational objectives. USAF assets provide the Joint Forces Commander and Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander critical operational capabilities to enhance maritime freedom of action. To provide a background, four cases, starting with the sinking of the Ostfriesland in 1921, spanning action in the Atlantic and Pacific during World War II, and ending with the Falkland Islands conflict in 1982, illustrate land-based airpower's ability to affect maritime freedom of action. Joint doctrine and Service doctrine prescribe how land- based airpower will and should be employed in support of maritime operational objectives. Additionally, USAF Countersea doctrine details how the JFACC could support the JFMCC at the operational level of war. Land-based airpower employed jointly with organic naval airpower can have a synergistic effect toward accomplishment of maritime objectives and reduce the risk to the force through persistent ISR, C2, AAR and stealth.