MRAPs, Irregular Warfare, and Pentagon Reform

摘要

Mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles offer an excellent case study for investigating the current debate over the Pentagon's emphasis on developing and fielding irregular warfare capabilities. The debate was highlighted by a series of recent articles in Joint Force Quarterly, including one by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who cited the slow fielding of MRAPs as a prime example of the Pentagon's institutional resistance to investments in irregular warfare capabilities. He personally intervened to ensure more than 10, 000 MRAPs were fielded quickly. Yet some analysts now argue MRAPs are not really useful for irregular warfare and are prohibitively expensive. As General Barry McCaffrey, USA (Ret.), asserted, 'It is the wrong vehicle, too late, to fit a threat we were actually managing.' The controversial MRAPs raise two questions. First, does the MRAP experience support the contention that the Pentagon is not sufficiently able to field irregular warfare capabilities. Second, what factors best explain the MRAP failure, whether that failure is determined to be their delayed fielding or the fact that they were fielded at all. We conclude that MRAPs are a valid irregular warfare requirement and that the Pentagon should have been better prepared to field them, albeit not on the scale demanded by events in Iraq. We also argue that the proximate cause of the failure to quickly field MRAPs is not the Pentagon's acquisition system but rather the requirements process, reinforced by more fundamental organizational factors. These findings suggest that acquisition reform is the wrong target for advancing Secretary Gates. objective of improving irregular warfare capabilities, and that achieving the objective will require more extensive reforms than many realize.