Equipping Network Warfare: Industrial-Era Bureaucracies for Information- Era Weapons

摘要

Over the last decade, cyberspace proponents within the Air Force have articulated their mission area's vision, developed warfighting doctrine, and organized units at the wing-level and below for network warfare operations. Airmen have been trained, forces for network warfare operations have been fielded, and professionalization programs have been proposed. Additionally, senior leadership has made final decisions regarding the organization of Air Force cyberspace capabilities within a numbered air force and the presentation of those forces to the joint warfighting community through a major command. The Air Force has clearly moved forward in achieving its recently modified mission statement to fly and fight in cyberspace. It has satisfied key components of the DOTMLFP construct (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, facilities and personnel) necessary to field and sustain a mission area and its component warfighting capabilities. Based on the levels of development and investment in complementary mission areas, it can be presumed that similar efforts must have been made and advances realized in fielding materiel capabilities for cyberspace. It can also be presumed that these capabilities were largely developed within the framework of existing Department of Defense and Service-specific processes to develop more traditional warfighting systems, although perhaps compartmentalized. These corporate processes have been broadly criticized for their growing inability to provide traditional warfighting capabilities on schedule and within budget, while also satisfying threshold operational requirements. These delivery delays, cost overruns and requirement shortfalls occur in the development programs of each Service, in programs developed for each operational medium (air, space, ground and maritime), and are independent of the prime defense contractor.