Lessons Not Learned: Civil-Military Disconnect in Afghanistan

摘要

The relief of two four-star operational commanders in Afghanistan, America's 'war of necessity,' warrants an examination of not only civil- military relations but also leader-follower dynamics and the question of whether there was a disconnect between these senior leaders and their bosses. Gen. David McKiernan and Gen. Stanley McChrystal both assumed the position of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commander at precarious times -- periods of transition -- for U.S. operations in Afghanistan. McKiernan was caught in the transition between presidential administrations and the inherent challenge to the existing strategy. Where DoD and the White House may have wanted or needed to show substantive movement, McKiernan may have been viewed as lumbering rather than innovative. A change in commanders provided a visible indication of the importance placed on the war effort by the new administration (and not necessarily the lack of competence of the officer). Likewise, McChrystal was caught in the period of the debate on the U.S. policy on Afghanistan and how to redirect the strategy to achieve the policy goals. McChrystal's presentation to the International Institute for Strategic Studies and his response to questions demonstrated a deep understanding of the operational issues and his role in the policy development process within the administration. But the perception of a 'runaway general' could not be allowed by Obama. Neither officer challenged the premise of civilian control of the military, and both dutifully implemented the military strategy aligned with U.S. policy for the theater. The essential difference is that McKiernan lost the confidence of DoD leaders, Gates and Mullen, while McChrystal lost the trust of the president. There are three lessons that military officers should take from this tale of two commanders who were relieved in Afghanistan. This article sets them forth.