One Size Does Not Fit All: How Acquisition Fails the Joint Force Commander

摘要

Financial and political forces have pulled DOD towards joint acquisition of multi-role fighters, and away from joint interdependence. This risky trend toward fewer, joint platforms has been exacerbated by the decision to end F-22 production at 187 aircraft and focus exclusively on fielding large numbers of the joint / multi-role F-35. With this plan, the DOD is accepting high risk to its future ability to achieve rapid air dominance. This risk is further heightened by the fact that the F-35 is early in its testing and has already fallen victim to some of the same trends in acquisition that plagued the F-22. If the F-35 program successfully delivers all 2,443 planned aircraft, it will ultimately account for 93% of the US fifth-generation fighter fleet and 78% of the total US tactical aviation fleet. This Done-size-fits-all approach has insidiously led to a flawed aircraft acquisition strategy that allows unacceptable risk to combat effectiveness in an attempt to gain efficiency. This efficiency is very likely to prove elusive, and the approach may be counterproductive, if achieved at the expense of effective core-competency contributions to joint interdependence. The paper examines the risks and implications for Joint Force Commanders associated with the current DOD fighter recapitalization plan. Ultimately, the paper challenges the conventional wisdom that fewer, large, joint acquisition programs are preferable to a larger number of smaller Service-specific programs.